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This study investigates the impact of corporate political connections on audit 
fees and earnings quality. Prior literature reports that politically connected companies 
pay higher audit fees and have poor earnings quality. The key motivation of this study 
hinges on the argument that in some institutional settings, there can be multiple power 
sources with dissimilar degrees of resource allocation and decision making abilities. 
This will affect the costs and benefits accrued to politically connected companies. For 
example, Pakistan has two visibly distinct power sources, political institutions, and the 
military. Political institutions are fragile and politicians are prone to public, media, and 
judicial scrutiny. The military has emerged as a key power player enabling them to 
command the process of resource allocation. Based on this visible distinction of the 
power streams, this study segregates politically connected companies in Pakistan into 
two groups, companies connected to the political elites, termed as civil connected 
companies and military connected companies.   
This study also examines the impact of political instability on audit fees and 
earnings quality. Prior literature examining the impact of political instability reports 
that political instability results in higher business risk and poor economic performance. 
Prior auditing literature reports that auditors charge a price premium from high risk 
clients. Prior earnings quality literature reports that poor economic performance results 
in poor earnings quality. By combining these streams of literature, this study 
investigates the auditing and earnings quality implications of political instability.  
Essay 1 of this study investigates the political determinants of audit fees in the 
context of Pakistan. The results indicate that civil connected companies pay 
significantly higher audit fees while military connected companies pay significantly 
lower audit fees relative to non-connected companies. The findings for political 
instability indicate that political instability has a positive association with audit fees. 
Nonetheless, this positive association is weaker for military connected companies 
relative to non-connected companies. Results for the interaction effect for civil 
connected companies are not significant.  
Essay 2 of this study investigates the political determinants of earnings quality 
in Pakistan. Earnings quality is measured by the level of absolute magnitude of 
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discretionary accruals and earnings persistence. The results indicate that civil connected 
companies report a significantly higher level of absolute magnitude of discretionary 
accruals indicating poor earnings quality, while the earnings persistence results are not 
significant for civil connected companies. The discretionary accruals results for 
military connected companies are not significant. Nevertheless, military connected 
companies have more persistent earnings indicating better earnings quality. 
Essay 2 also examines the impact of political instability on earnings quality. 
Results indicate a significant negative association between political instability and the 
level of absolute magnitude of discretionary accruals; and between political instability 
and earnings persistence. The interaction effects show that the negative association 
between political instability and the level of absolute magnitude of discretionary 
accruals is stronger for civil connected companies and not significant for military 
connected companies. The negative association between political instability and 
earnings persistence is weaker for military connected companies and not significant for 
civil connected companies.  
This study adds to the literature that aims to provide a deeper understanding of 
the relation between political connections, political institutions, and its auditing and 
earnings quality outcomes. The study adds to the existing political connections 
literature by identifying the military as a source of significant power. It also adds to the 
auditing and financial reporting literature by identifying political instability as a 
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